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Abstract. Learning and adaptation are central problems to both edusemiotics, or 
semiotics of education, and biosemiotics. Bildung, as an especially human way or form 
of learning, and evolution as the main form of adaptation for many biologists aft er 
Darwin are oft en regarded as mutually exclusive concepts even though human beings 
are undeniably one biological species among others. In this article I will try to build a 
bridge between the biosemiotical, edusemiotical and Bildung-theoretical stances. Central 
to this discussion is biosemiotician Kalevi Kull and some of his recent publications 
where he considers adaptation, evolution and learning. Th e primary theoretical resource 
that I utilize here, in addition to the general Greimassian, edusemiotical and Bildung-
theoretical starting points, is perceptual control theory (PCT) to which I compare the 
Uexküllian conception of functional circle.
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Introduction
In this article I study the connections between the concepts of learning and 
adaptation on the one hand and the connections between Bildung1 and evolution 
on the other. Learning and adaptation are central problems to both edusemiotics, 
or semiotics of education, and biosemiotics. Bildung, as an especially human way or 
1 ‘Bildung’ is an old German catch-word, which refers both to individual human – mostly 
mental – growth and to the development of human culture. It is sometimes translated as e.g. 
formation or culture, but all these alternatives are problematically narrow and confusing. See 
more at the end of this article.
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form of learning, and evolution as the main form of adaptation for many biologists, 
especially aft er Darwin, are oft en regarded as mutually exclusive concepts – this, 
despite the undeniable fact that human beings are just one biological species among 
others. It may fi rst seem that what is at stake here is a dualism or confl ict between 
two kinds of world views: on the one hand, a humanistic or anthropocentric one; 
on the other, a naturalistic or biological one. However, I will attempt to fi nd a 
common point to these poles of the concept. Concepts of learning, adaptation and 
evolution all have a very wide use in diff erent contexts: from animals to humans 
and even to machines and material and social systems. By contrast, Bildung is not 
very oft en used outside its original contexts in human culture and human learning. 
Th e aim of this study is to search for the common ground between edusemiotics 
and biosemiotics, the core of semiotics. As applied and developed in many areas 
of life, semiotics will naturally have many diff erent meanings: there will, therefore, 
be this or that semiotics and a semiotics of this and that. However, for ‘semiotics’ 
to have any meaning at all, there must be a common basis for all those diff erent 
branches. In this article I will try to build a bridge between the biosemiotical, 
edusemiotical and Bildung-theoretical stances. 
Despite having no expertise in biology, I shall venture to discuss in the following 
some statements made by one of the most remarkable developers of biosemiotics, 
Kalevi Kull (see Lindström et al. 2012). Kull’s insights are remarkably similar to 
my own views, which I have developed under the rubric of action-theoretical 
semiotics. However, the action-theoretical semiotics I have developed is based on 
Greimas, whereas Kull, like many biosemioticians, relies more on Peirce. Th e most 
important common starting point for both theoretical approaches is the circular 
model of action, originally developed by Jakob von Uexküll at the beginning of 
the 20th century (see Uexküll 1982). Th ere are, however, some notable diff erences 
in the interpretation of that model. I will claim that the internal dynamics of this 
circle can be understood best through Perceptual Control Th eory, developed by 
William T. Powers (2005[1973]). For Kull, and many others like myself until just a 
couple of years ago, the basic dynamic character which explains why some system 
acts circularly has remained quite fuzzy or even mystical. It must be stressed that 
I will not try to provide any systematic review of Kull’s works but will only pick 
some recent publications in which he considers adaptation, evolution and learning.
Adaptation and adaptiveness
If we look at learning and adaptation from the point of view of action theoretical 
semiotics, the fi rst fundamental dichotomy that comes to mind – and perhaps 
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should come to mind – is between being and doing (Greimas, Courtés 1982). We 
are not so much interested in the “passive” objects of our environment but rather 
in the active subjects – the kind we think we are ourselves. Th is, I believe, is one 
common starting point in edusemiotics and biosemiotics: living beings are entities 
which are subjects in the strong, common sense meaning. Th at means that they 
are subjects of both being and doing, whereas objects are only subjects of being. 
Objects are passive entities. Th ey are just what they are and can be aff ected by their 
environment, but they cannot actively aff ect anything. Of course, this dualism is 
leaky like most others. Objects have their own way of being, a habit if you will, 
and their properties are powerful (Heil 2012) enough to, in certain circumstances, 
aff ect other objects. Th ey are also selectively sensitive to the infl uences of other 
objects or subjects so that the consequences of those infl uences to the way of being 
of a patient object depend also on its current way of being. In this way, objects are 
also (at least pre- or proto-) semiotical beings (see Pikkarainen 2013, 2016).
For now, we are more interested in the ways of being and doing of active, living 
subjects. It is just their ways of being and doing which are changed via learning 
and adaptation. In its everyday use, the term ‘adaptation’ has (at least in Finnish) 
a somewhat fatalistic fl avour. It means that usually some subject becomes adapted 
to its conditions. Th is meaning probably derives from biology. Originally, the 
term ‘adapt/adaptation’ seems to have been more active, coming into English from 
French ‘adapter’, and into French from the Latin ‘adaptare’ – ‘to’ + ‘fi t’2. It was used 
in the sense of a subject adapting an object to some use or need. But, since Darwin, 
it has been used in the passive voice: a subject (or species or system) becomes 
adapted to some situation or conditions. In biology adaptation has now two uses: 
either it is a process in which an organism or species becomes better suited to its 
environment, or it is the result of such a process. If in an adaptation process the 
organism acquires a new way of action or a new organ, these new ways or new 
organs are called adaptations (Kull 2014). 
In biology, the concept of adaptation is usually connected to the concepts of 
evolution, natural selection and fi tness. Evolution refers to hereditary changes in a 
species of organism. Th e inheritable changes from one generation to another can 
be caused by mutations or other random genetic alterations. Some changes will 
remain as features of the members of new generations and others will not, because 
the parents with x features have more children and the parents with y features have 
fewer children. Th is eff ect is called natural selection: some features are selected to 
continue, while others will vanish. Fitness is the quantitative measure of just that 
2 Adapt. In: English Oxford Living Dictionaries. Oxford: Oxford University Press; retrieved 
from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/adapt.
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ability to reproduce aff ectively and thus make one’s own features general. If fi tness 
must be measured intragenerationally, the growth rate can be used (Sznajder et 
al. 2012: 308). It is clear that these concepts are not entirely suitable if we study 
edusemiotics and human learning, because then, for example, those groups of 
humans who reproduce rapidly – some sects and people in underdeveloped 
countries, on the one hand, or overweight people of rich western countries, on 
the other – should be regarded as the fi ttest and best adapted.
Kull stresses that instead of, or in addition to, the quantitative measure of 
fi tness, a qualitative criterion of adaptation is needed. Th is criterion is needed in 
biology to diff erentiate between adaptive and neutral evolution. Th e criterion is 
that adaptation – in the original etymological meaning – that makes something 
suitable for a use, or is adjusted to something. Th at being so, a change is “adaptive 
if it solves some problem a living being faces” (Kull 2014: 287). In a similar 
way, we could talk about adaptive and neutral learning. Th e diff erence between 
learning and evolution is that the former means an ontogenetic change which is 
not inheritable, and which is thus reversible in future generations. Neutral changes 
are those which are not adaptive, i.e. they do not solve any problems of those 
beings in whom the changes take place.
At this point we can make some classifi cations. First, adaptation can be either 
active or passive. In the former case the subject solves some problem by adapting 
something in its environment, for example it can turn down an obstacle, fi nd a tool 
to make something, kill an enemy or eat a prey. All these are adaptive changes, not 
in the subject, but rather in the environment3 and caused by the subject. In this 
sense we can say that the normal more or less successful action of the subject is 
adaptation or adaptive. In the latter case the subject itself changes. Th is could be a 
physical change such as the subject’s growth in size, or growth of a new organ, or 
becoming more resistant, etc. If falling objects hurt the subject, then the growth 
of a more resistant upper skin will be adaptive, and, if getting fruit from a tree is 
diffi  cult, then the growth of the subject’s height is adaptive. On the other hand, the 
change could happen in the ways in which the subject acts. It can start to avoid an 
obstacle, use a tool in a new way, make friends with an enemy, or change its diet. 
Th ese kinds of changes are called ‘learning’ and they will be considered in more 
detail below.
3 Here it must be remembered that the subject is in, and part of, its own environment. For 
example, moving where the subject causes immediate changes in its own position, and thus 
mediated changes in the relationships of its environment, is active adaptation. Only the changes 
in the subject which cannot be immediately caused by itself should be counted as passive. 
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Here we should look at one special character of adaptive learning. It is a form 
of passive adaptation; but unlike the physical passive adaptation there is nothing 
adaptive in it as such. It is adaptive only and as much as it aff ects the way of action, 
i.e. the subject’s active adaptation of its environment. Th at is why it is necessary to 
study action before learning and learning only in the context of action.
Circular model of action
Th e Urvater of biosemiotics and theoretical biology Jakob von Uexküll (1864-
1944) wanted to develop a biology which is based on the purposefulness of 
organisms instead of (or, rather, in addition to) their physiology, which uses only 
causal relations. He developed two extremely important and infl uential – and 
interconnected – concepts: the functional circle4 and the umwelt. He started to 
develop his concept of the functional circle already in the fi rst decades of the 20th 
century (Kull 2001). Its most mature form appeared in Bedeutungslehre, written 
in 1940 and translated and published in English in 1982 (Uexküll 1982: 32). Th e 
model (see Fig. 1) is somewhat modifi ed here, but its information content is as 
it was in the original. It is fl ipped, as in a mirror image, to better evoke a new 
model, which will be considered below. In addition, some of the original terms 
are abbreviated. Th e diagram should be read so that, above, there is the Subject 
organism or Meaning-Receiver which has two kinds of organs: a Perceptual Organ 
(PO) and an Eff ector Organ (EO). Th ese organs have Eff ector and Receptor parts 
which are in contact with some external Object. Below, there is the Object which 
has two parts just like the Subject: Eff ector is in contact with Eff ector Cue-Carrier 
(ECC) and Receptor is in contact with Perceptual Cue-Carrier (PCC). Th ese two 
parts, or carriers, are connected together by the Objective Connecting Structure 
(OCS) and together they form the Object as Meaning-Carrier. In Uexküll’s (1982: 
31) own words: “Because every behaviour begins by creating a perceptual cue and 
ends by printing an eff ector cue on the same meaning-carrier, one may speak of a 
functional circle that connects the meaning-carrier with the subject”. 
Th e subject’s umwelt, i.e. its subjective universe, is created by its functional 
circles. According to Uexküll there are four important functional circles for most 
organisms, namely, the functional circles of physical medium, food, enemy and sex 
(Uexküll 1982: 33). Th is means that there are at least those four kinds of meaning-
4 A terminological note: Uexküll’s original term was ‘Funktionskreis’, which has been 
translated as ‘functional circle’ in Uexküll 1982. However, in the remarkable special issue 
of Semiotica in 2001, dedicated to Uexküll and containing more than 800 pages, the phrase 
‘functional cycle’ appears. In PCT, the circular model of control is called ‘loop’.
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carriers in every umwelt: physical objects (perhaps obstacles or possibilities for 
movement), prey or other food, predators or other enemies and possible mating 
partners. Th ere is nothing meaningless in any umwelt. Th e subject’s whole active 
life consists of its functional circles.
Figure 1. Model of the functional circle.
Instead of analysing the functional circle further, I would like to compare it with 
a somewhat more recent creation of William T. Powers (1926–2013), namely 
the perceptual control theory (PCT) (Powers et al. 1960; Powers 2005[1973]). 
Powers was not a biologist, but an engineer, and he built his theory from the very 
simple and much overlooked phenomenon of negative feedback. In the model 
of the negative feedback loop (see Fig. 2.) there are two poles: the subject (e.g. 
an organism or other system) and its environment. Th e subject can perceive 
something in its environment and it can also aff ect that something. Th us, the 
model’s structure is very similar to that of the functional circle, but there is a 
striking diff erence. We could ask: why should the subject waste energy to aff ect that 
something in the environment which was perceived? For many, and especially for 
biologists, this question may perhaps sound trivial, and the answer is felt to be too 
self-evident to even be considered. Probably this is why it has not been explicated 
in the model of the functional circle. In fact, Uexküll sounds almost behaviouristic 
when he intimates that the perceptual cue just causes the eff ector to operate, even 
though the connection is not thought of as a physical causality, but rather as a 
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musical induction, where one note leads to another note in a melody5. Note that 
in his model the perceptual and eff ector organs are connected by an empty line 
only, with no labels or explanations. However, Kull and Magnus have stated very 
clearly that the “circles of perception and action follow one another until the need 
that initiated them has been satisfi ed” (Kull, Magnus 2012: 651; my emphasis, E. P.).
It is exactly that need, or some similar state of aff airs, that gets the subject 
to make an eff ort to aff ect the objects it perceives in its environment, which is 
modelled into the negative feedback loop and which separates PCT from other 
similar approaches. We do not act on all objects that we perceive but on a few only; 
and even those objects that we act on are not necessarily acted on continuously, 
but just occasionally. Hence the question: what causes that action – or rather, 
what causes the actual need that gets the subject to act? Here, PCT off ers a simple 
solution, with two additional factors to the circular model (Powers 2005[1973]: 44–
47). Th e more important one is Reference, which is the internal goal or standard of 
the subject for some perception. Allowing a slightly metaphorical formulation, we 
could say that Reference is what the subject wants to perceive. In an ideal situation, 
the subject is in perfect harmony with its environment (in Heaven or nirvana) and 
perceives only what it wants to perceive. Th is harmony can be broken by one of 
two causes: either the subject’s reference changes or the environment changes. Th at 
latter cause is called Disturbance. 
Th e diff erence – called Error – between the perception and the reference is what 
causes the needs of the subject, and, consequently, the action – called Output – 
which is directed to cancel the disturbance. Th e error is calculated using a simple 
subtraction in a part of the circle called Comparator. When, and only when, an 
error appears, either as a consequence of a reference change or a disturbance, 
or both, will the subject evince an actual need at which an output as action or 
behaviour is initiated. Th e output can consist of muscular movements or, in some 
cases, of secretion – or perhaps something else – and it will continue as long as 
the error prevails. 
 
5 According to Jämsä (2001: 481), Uexküll was one of the fi rst to see life as continuous pro-
cess.
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Figure 2. Th e model of the negative feedback loop.
Th us, the action of a subject is always in terms of control of perception i.e. bringing 
the perception near to the reference and keeping it there. What is important to 
notice is that if we study a complex organism, for instance an animal, it does 
not consist only of some parallel and alternative circles such as the object, the 
enemy, food and sex but still more importantly of a network of a multitude of 
hierarchically organized circles. Th e lowest circles take care of the relatively simple 
quantitative interactions with the environment. Higher circles combine and 
manage the perceptions of the lower ones and determine their references (Powers 
2008: 127–144). In Uexküllian terms, the hierarchy of the elementary control 
circles form the Innenwelt of the organism which must somehow be similar to its 
umwelt. Th e lowest-level circles perceive only simple quantitative features such as 
intensities, distances, weights etc. but at the higher levels the conscious qualia and 
conceptual perceptions like objects, relations, events and principles are formed 
from these “raw data” (see Powers 1998: 27–43).
The concept of learning 
In addition to the natural fact that the concept of learning is central to edusemiotics, 
it is also extremely important to biosemiotics. Th is is amply illustrated at two levels 
in Kull’s writings. First, learning is a basic feature of all life: “Organic plasticity – 
the ability to solve unexpected problems, to accommodate one’s behaviour during 
the lifetime, according to circumstances – is a universal feature of all living beings” 
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(Kull 2014: 288). Secondly, the phenomenon of learning is the basic starting-point 
for developing a biosemiotic or meaning-based alternative to the Neo-Darwinian 
theory of evolution. Th e idea behind this theory project is that evolution is not 
wholly, or perhaps not even essentially, driven by blind natural selection (of blind 
mutations), but instead it is driven by the meaningful learning of organisms in 
new situations. Th e random mutations and the meaningful mating behaviour then 
make these new learned behaviours genetically fi xed and irreversibly inheritable 
(Kull 2014: 290-291). Th is means that learning and meaningful action is not made 
possible by evolution but, rather, the other way around: learning and meaningful 
action make evolution possible. 
Th is view is extremely interesting, but here the concept of learning seems to 
be too general. First, if it is identifi ed with organic, i.e. phenotypic, plasticity, 
which contains also those passive physical adaptations like becoming more 
durable or growing taller or, in an extreme case, growing a new organ. Secondly, 
the ability to solve problems and to accommodate one’s behaviour according to 
circumstances does not necessarily mean, or require, learning. Th is is because 
action, as such, is always problem-solving and an accommodation of one’s 
behaviour to circumstances. According to the PCT model of action, behaviour is 
always initiated by the problem that perception does not correspond to the subject’s 
reference. Th e subject tries to solve this problem by accommodating its behaviour 
to circumstances so that the disturbance would be cancelled, and perception be 
drawn nearer to the reference. Th is is just the case of the subject’s active adaptation 
and it is not the same thing as learning. 
I have found it helpful to diff erentiate between learning and action using (in 
the Greimassian way) the concepts of competence and performance. Every active 
behaviour – be it empirically perceivable or not – is performance. Performances 
can be more or less skilful, and they always appear in a new way and form in new 
contexts. Performances as such, however, are not learning. Performances are made 
possible by the subject’s special features, called competences. Competences are 
part of the way of being for the subject similarly as dispositions are for objects, 
and they assumedly exist in the subject also during the periods when they are not 
manifested in performance (cf. Martin 2002). Because action is always problem-
solving, it will appear as different performances depending on the changing 
circumstances even though the competences remain the same and no learning is 
not required. Only the process of the changing of the subject’s competences should 
be called learning (Pikkarainen 2014). Th is diff erentiation is not at all threatened 
by the possible, and even probable, matter of the fact that learning – the change of 
competences – will take place only as a consequence or side-eff ect of the subject’s 
action – performances.
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“Semiotic learning”
In several of his publications, Kull has developed a very interesting view of a special 
semiotic form of learning, also explaining how learning happens (see esp. Kull 
2015a). Th e concept of semiotic learning is based on, and interconnected with, 
a bunch of other central concepts, especially those of the phenomenal present, 
the logical confl ict, semiosis and some others. It can be depicted negatively as 
diff erentiation from such non-living and non-semiotic phenomena like natural 
selection and machine learning. Th e idea is based on the general and traditional 
Uexküllian biosemiotical programme, which studies living beings from the point of 
view of meanings. Kull sharpens this view by stating that biosemiotics (and especially 
zoosemiotics) provides a phenomenological approach to the internal aspects of an 
organism’s life – its umwelt. Here I again must compare this to PCT, where the aim 
is to fi nd out what perceptions the subject is trying to control (Runkel 1990).
Kull ties the phenomenological approach to the concept of semiosis, which 
he identifi es with interpretation (Kull 2015a: 144–145). In turn, interpretation 
requires two conditions: on the one hand, a logical confl ict or an incompatibility of 
some options or choices; on the other, a phenomenological now or internal present 
as a subjective duration felt as one moment so that the options or choices, which 
computationally taken are always sequential, are seen simultaneously. During that 
internal present the options are not in any predetermined order and so the subject 
can in some way order them and choose between them freely.6 Th us, the choice 
must not be determined causally or probabilistically. 
However, to be adaptive the choice should not be purely random either. Rather, 
it is based on semiotic scaff olding. Th is explains why a “principally free choice can 
oft en produce entirely predictable behaviours, if described by an outside observer” 
(Kull 2015b: 620). Th e concept of semiotic scaff olding was developed by, e.g., 
Jesper Hoff meyer from the Neo-Vygotskian use of the term ‘scaff olding’. It means, 
simply, that all semioses leave traces and thus form a scaff olding structure, which 
then supports and guides the subsequent semioses. In fact, it is precisely this that 
defi nes what semiotic learning is about.
Kull (2015b: 620) describes the process of semiotic learning in as follows: fi rst 
the subject acquires rules (or habits); then in some situation a confl ict occurs 
between these rules and, fi nally, the subject solves the confl ict by choosing between 
the confl icting options. Here, some problems arise. Th e rule or habit is described 
6 Here Kull seems to think that there cannot be other ordering principles between the 
options than the temporal sequence. Still, it feels very probable that there could be other kinds 
of weight diff erences between the options, which would determine their order, even if they 
were simultaneous.
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as an operation in the form: “IF a THEN DO b” (Kull 2015b: 617). Th is is a very 
rigid formulation, resembling closely the behaviouristic “laws”, in which a certain 
external stimulus determines the subject’s response. A living organism does not 
act in this way, because its doings are determined by its own goals rather than 
by external stimuli. Secondly, if the solution of the confl ict is found by choosing 
from the confl icting rules, then no new rule will ever occur. At best, some of 
the existing rules become stronger than the others. Kull himself has stated this 
scheme also quite diff erently, naming the stages as ‘incompatibility’, ‘innovation’ 
and ‘habituation’ (Kull 2015a: 229). However, further in this text, Kull still writes 
only about choice. 
In a PCT model there is no possibility of choosing – at least at the level of the 
individual control unit, even though there can be a confl ict between perception 
and reference. Similarly, as conceived by Kull, these confl icting parties must exist 
simultaneously, but the subject does not choose between them: it only compares 
them and creates the error as a result of a subtraction operation. Th ere is no 
choice for the subject:7 if it perceives something and if that perception does 
not correspond to its reference, then an output will necessarily ensue from the 
error, which tries to correct the situation by cancelling the disturbance. Although 
this might seem like an automatic reaction, it can still be regarded as free action 
because it is fully based on the subject’s own self-determined goals. This is 
precisely the diff erence between living organisms and engineered machines: the 
former have their own innate and self-determined goals; whereas for the latter, the 
goals are externally determined by the building engineer or the user who sets the 
adjustments. Learning, in PCT, is assumed to take place as a reorganization of the 
parts of the hierarchical control network, the Innenwelt of the organism (Stables 
et al. 2018: 211–212).
It seems, therefore, that too much is required from semiosis and life – which 
in biosemiotics are generally understood as co-existing phenomena – from the 
assumption that in the internal present there should always be such confl icts and 
choice-making. Rather, it is suffi  cient that there are the innate and internal goals 
which the organism can strive for thanks to the negative feedback loop8. However, 
that conception of internal confl ict solution through choice or innovation during 
the internal present sounds extremely useful for analysis of, primarily, humans – 
no doubt animals, too – and their umwelten. In PCT, learning is modelled as a 
reorganization driven by errors in critical homeostatic variables or continuing 
7 Th is could also be expressed so that a control system always “chooses” what it already 
thinks to be the best choice.
8 Powers (1995) has also studied how the beginning of life can be seen as the appearance of 
the fi rst chemical compound which started to actively preserve itself. 
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errors in normal control (Powers 1998: 46–57). Th e process of reorganization is 
guided by an evolution-like algorithm which is structurally similar to the method 
of movement guidance of the e-coli bacterium (Powers 2008: 107–112). However, 
in complex organisms this process is strongly aff ected by consciousness (Powers 
2009) and here, naturally, pondering between diff erent possibilities of action is a 
strong and central source of learning.  
From forms of learning to Bildung
According to Kull there are four hypothetical forms of both learning and umwelten 
(Kull 2017: 147). Th e classifi cation of the forms of learning is based on the main 
types of signs – and the forms of umwelten as based on respective forms of learning. 
Th e forms of learning are imprinting (iconic signs), conditioning (indexical signs), 
imitating (emonic signs) and conventioning (symbols). Th e fi rst form means that 
the subject learns to attach a sign to something, or perhaps, rather, to recognize 
something as a sign of something. Here it is important that the iconic sign is 
not based on objective similarity, but rather the similarity which is created in the 
recognition. Th is is the form of learning which is possible, for example, in plants; 
and thus it is the basis for the fi rst form of umwelten, namely vegetative ones.9 
Th e second form of learning requires that the subject should connect two signs 
together. Th e nervous system is eff ective in making connections between separate 
signs and activities and so this form of learning is the basis for animal umwelten. 
Th e third form of learning is an interesting exception from Kull’s otherwise quite 
purely Peircean system. By imitation, Kull refers to a sign relation where a subject 
links the exteroceptive and proprioceptive perceptions of some activity. Th is makes 
it possible to learn from the action of other subjects. Although this learning is 
connected to the social umwelt, it is not available to all social animals but only to 
vertebrates. Th e last form of learning requires the handling of most complex sign 
relations, namely symbols, because there the subject must intentionally combine 
and recombine diff erent signs. Th is last form is clearly typical of humans only.
According to a model of modal learning which I developed (Stables et al. 
2018: Ch. 15) based on the Greimassian conception of modalities, the modal 
competences of all (especially human) action are want, can, know and must 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982). Here, I will touch on the question of modalities only 
as far as necessary and instead concentrate on the structural similarity between 
the levels of learning in my model and in Kull’s. Th e main diff erence with respect 
9 Here we should note that Kull is more permissive than Uexküll, who restricted the concept 
of umwelt to animals. Plants had only dwelling-integuments, not umwelten.
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to Kull’s model is that modal learning is about the development of the subject’s 
competences of action – including both external bodily action and internal mental 
or thinking action – whereas Kull’s semiotic learning seems to be most interested 
in the development of knowledge as the ability to use diff erent kinds of signs. In 
the current model of modal learning there are three levels of learning – or rather 
of Bildung. I will return to this later. Here the diff erentiating principle between the 
levels is mainly the form of the modality of must. Th e fi rst level is that of pragmatic 
learning. Th is somewhat connects the two fi rst levels of Kull’s model. In this level 
the must is in the form of an implicit or explicit technical norm: if you want A then 
you must do B (see von Wright, 1963). Th e second level is social learning where new 
forms of must develop as social norms on the one hand, and altruistic motives on 
the other. Th e third level is called existentialistic, because at this stage the individual 
conscience as abstract ethical principles and ways to compare them develop.
Traditionally, in Continental pedagogical thinking, the special human form 
of learning is referred to using the concept of Bildung. Th is German term has 
no proper English equivalent or translation and perhaps it will someday share 
the fate of the term ‘umwelt’. However, given the theoretical and historical load 
of this term, it will probably take some time before that happens (see Siljander 
et al. 2012). Th e concept of Bildung has many sides (Pikkarainen 2016; 2017). 
First, it involves the human way of learning connected to culture and language. As 
such, it comes very close to Kull’s learning as conventioning (cf. Brandom 2009; 
McDowell 1996). Secondly, it refers to the active development of culture and the 
ways of being of the entire humankind. Hence, it contains an active adaptation 
by action within itself. Th irdly, there is the question of the contents of Bildung: 
what competences should human beings learn, what knowledge, what skills, what 
attitudes, etc.? Th us, the Bildung concept has clearly a normative load to it which 
may make it strange to natural scientists but less so to biosemioticians (see e.g. 
Hoff meyer 1995; Tønnessen et al. 2015). Th is normative content also means that 
Bildung is always connected to education as an intentional and institutional activity 
(Kontio et al. 2017).
Bildung as a human adaptivity should not be seen as only the perfection of 
human possibilities as it has been oft en traditionally thought of, but also human 
problem solving. Typical of problem solving in a dense ecosystem and, even more, 
in an overcrowded and technologically networked modern world is that it causes 
always many side-eff ects and possibly more and worse new problems than it solves. 
Th is phenomenon stresses a certain general type of goal or content of Bildung, 
namely a kind of respectfulness. In PCT discussion the concepts of arbitrary and 
respectful control are diff erentiated (Marken, Carey 2015: 97; Powers 2005[1973]: 
271) in which the latter means that we take into consideration the side-eff ects of 
a tati , lear i , il
448 Eetu Pikkarainen
our actions to other subjects – and also to ourselves in the future. Kull’s theoretical 
innovation of emonic learning as a general prerequisite of empathy could add 
useful tools to achieving this goal.
Conclusions
In this article I attempted to map and discuss some connections, and also some 
controversies in these connections, between my edusemiotic views and Kalevi 
Kull’s respective biosemiotic theories. I have stated that the common Uexküllian 
circular model of action could be enriched and particularized by utilizing 
concepts and models of the Perceptual Control Th eory. I have also suggested that 
the concept of learning could be analysed more fruitfully by using the concepts 
of competence and performance and defi ning it as a change or development of 
competences of the subject. Th at change, or development, could then be studied 
further as the reorganization of the subject’s control hierarchy. Th is could then 
be combined easily with Kull’s theory of the four forms or levels of learning and 
umwelten. Also, the types of signs and especially the idea of emonic signs should 
be utilized in the model of modal learning. Th e idea of internal present and confl ict 
solution is probably most fruitfully applied with the phenomena of consciousness 
or at least awareness – or eusemiosis in the sense of Sharov (2012: 63).
Perhaps the most important fi nding of this study is the reinforcement of the 
view of a certain parallelism between the concept of Bildung and the concept 
of evolution. First, both are open-ended processes, leading continuously to 
something new. Already in 1858, Alfred R. Wallace, starting from a surprisingly 
explicit concept of negative feedback phenomenon, reasoned that nature has a 
tendency to create varieties and develop them further and further with no defi nite 
limits (Darwin, Wallace 1971). Kull adds here a remarkable semiotic twist by 
founding the creative development on meaningful action and problem solving of 
individual organisms and their communities. Th is brings evolution very close to 
the defi nition: “Th e term Bildung refers to process by which humanity produces 
humanity itself in individual action and coexistence” (Kivelä et al. 2012: 306).  
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Адаптация, обучение, Bildung: дискуссия с семиотикой 
образования и биосемиотикой
Обучение и адаптация являются центральными проблемами как семиотики образования, 
так и биосемиотики. Становление (Bildung) как исключительно человеческая форма 
обучения и эволюция как главная форма адаптации многими биологами после Дарвина 
часто рассматриваются как взаимоисключающие понятия. В этой статье я попытаюсь 
построить мост между позициями биосемиотики, семиотики образования (edusemiotical) 
и позициями Bildung-теории. В центре дискуссии недавние публикации биосемиотика 
Калеви Кулля, в которых он рассматривает адаптацию, эволюцию и обучение. Основной 
теоретический ресурс, которым я пользуюсь, в дополнении к теориям Греймаса, 
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является теория перцептуального контроля, которая сопоставляется с концепцией 
функционального круга Юкскюлля.
Adapteerumine, õppimine, Bildung: 
diskussioon haridus- ja biosemiootikaga
Õppimine ja adapteerumine on nii haridussemiootika kui ka biosemiootika kesksed probleemid. 
Bildung kui inimomane õppimisviis ning evolutsioon kui paljude Darwini-järgsete bioloogide 
jaoks peamine võimalus adapteeruda on tihti esitatud teineteist välistavate mõistetena, kuigi 
inimeste näol on kahtlemata tegu ühe bioloogilise liigiga teiste seas. Käesolevas artiklis üritan 
omavahel ühendada biosemiootilisi, haridussemiootilisi ja Bildung-semiootilisi hoiakuid. 
Diskussiooni keskmes on mõned biosemiootik Kalevi Kulli hiljutised publikatsioonid, milles 
ta käsitleb adapteerumist, evolutsiooni ja õppimist. Esmane teoreetiline ressurss, mida siinkohal 
lisaks Greimasest lähtuvatele, haridussemiootilistele ja Bildung-semiootilistele lähtekohtadele 
kasutan, on tajukontrolli teooria (PCT), millega kõrvutan Uexkülli funktsiooniringi mõistet.
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